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Civic Platform

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This article is about a political party in Poland. For the political party in Russia with the same name in English, see Civic Platform (Russia).

Civic Platform of
the Republic of Poland
Platforma Obywatelska
Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej
AbbreviationPO
ChairmanDonald Tusk
General SecretaryMarcin Kierwiński
Parliamentary leaderZbigniew Konwiński [pl]
SpokespersonJan Grabiec
Founders
Founded24 January 2001; 23 years ago (2001-01-24)
Split from
Headquartersul. Wiejska 12A, 00-490 Warsaw
Membership (2023)24,497[1]
Ideology
Political positionCentre-right
National affiliationCivic Coalition
Senate Pact 2023 (for 2023 Senate election)
European affiliationEuropean People's Party
European Parliament groupEuropean People's Party
Colours
  •   Orange
  •   Blue
Sejm
125 / 460
Senate[2]
36 / 100
European Parliament[3]
21 / 52
Regional assemblies
210 / 552
City presidents
40 / 107
Website
www.platforma.org Edit this at Wikidata

The Civic Platform (Polish: Platforma Obywatelska, PO)[nb 1] is a centre-right liberal conservative political party in Poland. Since 2021, it has been led by Donald Tusk, who previously led it from 2003 to 2014 and was President of the European Council from 2014 to 2019.

It was formed in 2001 by splinter factions from the Solidarity Electoral Action, the Freedom Union and the Conservative People's Party, and it later placed second in the 2001 Polish parliamentary election. It remained at the opposition until the 2007 Polish parliamentary opposition, when it overtook Law and Justice, won 209 seats, and Tusk was elected as Prime Minister of Poland. Following the Smolensk air disaster in 2010, Bronisław Komorowski served as acting president of Poland and later won the 2010 Polish presidential election. Tusk continued to serve as prime minister and leader of Civic Platform until he resigned in 2014 to assume the post of the president of the European Council. The party was defeated in the 2015 Polish parliamentary and presidential elections. It placed second in the 2019 Polish parliamentary election, and its 2020 Polish presidential election candidate, Rafał Trzaskowski, won 49% of the popular vote in the second round and lost the election to Andrzej Duda.

Initially positioned as a Christian democratic party with strong economically liberal tendencies, it soon adopted liberal conservatism throughout the 2000s. During its time in power, it was aligned with more pragmatic and centrist views, and was characterized as a catch-all party. In the 2010s, the Civic Platform adopted more socially liberal policies, aligned itself with conservative liberalism and economic neoliberalism, and it has since been positioned in the centre-right. It has also strongly advocated for Poland's membership in the European Union and NATO. It is a member of the European People's Party.

The party heads the Civic Coalition, which was founded in 2018. Since its creation, it has shown strong electoral performances in Warsaw, the west, and the north of Poland. Since the 2000s, the Civic Platform has established itself as one of the dominant political parties in Poland.

History

The Civic Platform was founded in 2001 as economically liberal, Christian-democratic split from existing parties. Founders Andrzej Olechowski, Maciej Płażyński, and Donald Tusk were sometimes jokingly called "the Three Tenors" by Polish media and commentators. Olechowski and Płażyński left the party during the 2001–2005 parliamentary term, leaving Tusk as the sole remaining founder, and current party leader.

In the 2001 general election, the party secured 12.6% of the vote and 65 deputies in the Sejm, making it the largest opposition party to the government led by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). In the 2002 local elections, PO stood together with Law and Justice in 15 voivodeships (in 14 as POPiS, in Podkarpacie with another centre-right political parties). They stood separately only in Mazovia.

The POPiS coalition won 12% of the popular vote nationally, which was well below the expectations. Ludwik Dorn, the chairman of the PiS parliamentary club at the time, remarked: "Together, we gained as much as the PO itself collected a year earlier." This marked the point at which PO and PiS, until now ideological and political allies, started to grow apart. The leadership of PiS decided that it had to distance itself from PO and change its ideology in order to increase its popular support.[4]

In 2005, PO led all opinion polls with 26% to 30% of public support. However, in the 2005 general election, in which it was led by Jan Rokita, PO polled only 24.1% and unexpectedly came second to the 27% garnered by Law and Justice (PiS). A centre-right coalition of PO and PiS (nicknamed POPiS) was deemed most likely to form a government after the election. Yet the putative coalition parties had a falling out in the wake of the fiercely contested Polish presidential election of 2005.

In the 2005 elections, PiS attacked PO by campaigning on a difference between "liberal Poland" and its "social Poland". The former was marked by economic liberalism, austerity, deregulation and "serving the rich". In contrast, Law and Justice stressed its "social" character, pledging policies that would help the poor. The party attacked Civic Platform's flat tax proposal and advocated a much more active role of the state in the economy. Law and Justice also made "an offer to the left", stressing its economically left-wing policies.[5]

Ultimately, Lech Kaczyński (PiS) won the second round of the presidential election on 23 October 2005 with 54% of the vote, ahead of Tusk, the PO candidate. Due to the demands of PiS for control of all the armed ministries (the Defence Ministry, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and the office of the Prime Minister, PO and PiS were unable to form a coalition. Instead, PiS formed a coalition government with the support of the League of Polish Families (LPR) and Self-Defense of the Republic of Poland (SRP). PO became the opposition to this PiS-led coalition government.

The PiS-led coalition fell apart in 2007 amid a corruption scandal involving Andrzej Lepper and Tomasz Lipiec[6] and internal leadership disputes. These events led to new elections, and in the 21 October 2007 parliamentary election PO won 41.51% of the popular vote and 209 out of 460 seats in the Sejm and 60 out of 100 seats in the Senate of Poland. Civic Platform, now the largest party in both houses of parliament, subsequently formed a coalition with the Polish People's Party (PSL).

At the 2010 Polish presidential election, following the Smolensk air disaster which killed the incumbent Polish president Lech Kaczyński, Tusk decided not to present his candidature, considered an easy possible victory over PiS leader Jarosław Kaczyński. During the PO primary elections, Bronisław Komorowski defeated the Oxford-educated, PiS defector Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski. At the polls, Komorowski defeated Jarosław Kaczyński, ensuring PO dominance over the current Polish political landscape.[7]

In November 2010, local elections granted Civic Platform about 30.1 percent of the votes and PiS at 23.2 percent, an increase for the former and a drop for the latter compared to the 2006 elections.[7] PO succeeded in winning four consecutive elections (a record in post-Communist Poland), and Tusk remains as kingmaker. PO's dominance is also a reflection of left-wing weakness and divisions on both sides of the political scene, with PiS suffering a splinter in Autumn 2010.[7] Civic Platform won the plurality of votes in the 9 October 2011 parliamentary election, gaining 39.18% of the popular vote, 207 of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 63 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[8]

In the 2014 European elections, Civic Platform came first place nationally, achieving 32.13% of the vote and returning 19 MEPs.[9] In the 2014 local elections, PO achieved 179 seats, the highest single number.[10] In the 2015 presidential election, PO endorsed Bronisław Komorowski, a former member of PO from 2001 till 2010. He lost the election receiving 48.5% of the popular vote, while Andrzej Duda won with 51.5%.[11]

In the 2015 parliamentary election, PO came in second place, after PiS, achieving 24.09% of the popular vote, 138 out of 460 seats in the Sejm, and 34 out of 100 seats in the Senate.[12] In the 2018 local elections, PO achieved 26.97% of the votes, coming second after PiS.[13] In the 2019 European elections, PO participated in the European Coalition electoral alliance which achieved 38.47%, coming second after PiS.[14] On 1 October 2023, it held The Million Hearts march in Warsaw.[15]

Ideology

Civic Platform banner carried during the opposition march on 4 June 2023

The Civic Platform has been mainly described as a centre-right political party.[23] Due to the peculiarity of Polish politics, as a major liberal opponent of the conservative PiS, the party is also classified as centrist[24] or centre-left.[25] It has also been described as liberal-conservative,[26][27][28] Christian democratic,[29][30][31][32] conservative,[33][34] conservative-liberal,[35][36] classical-liberal,[37] liberal,[38] and social-liberal.[39][40] It was also described as pragmatic and big tent.[41][42][43] It supports Poland's membership in the European Union.[44]

Since 2007, when Civic Platform formed the government, the party has gradually moved from its Christian-democratic stances, and many of its politicians hold more liberal positions on social issues. In 2013, the Civic Platform's government introduced public funding of in vitro fertilization program. Civic Platform also supports civil unions for same-sex couples but is against same-sex marriage and the adoption of children by same-sex couples. The party also currently supports liberalization of the abortion law,[45] which it had opposed while in government.[46]

PO was described as neoliberal,[16][47][17][48] economically liberal,[34][49] and fiscally conservative.[50] Despite this and declaring in the parliamentary election campaign the will to limit taxation in Poland,[34] it increased the excise imposed on diesel oil, alcoholic beverages, tobacco, and oil.[51][52] The party refrained from implementing the flat tax, instead increasing value-added tax from 22% to 23% in 2011.[53] The party also eliminated many tax exemptions.[54][55][56] In response to the climate crisis, the Civic Platform has promised to end the use of coal for energy in Poland by 2040.[57]

After becoming the biggest opposition party, the Civic Platform became more culturally liberal and populist.[58][59][60][61] This tendency is especially popular among the younger generation of the party's politicians, such as mayor of Warsaw and presidential candidate Rafał Trzaskowski. The party has also changed its opinion about the social programs of PiS, starting to support them.[62][63][64] Since being in government again, the party has taken an anti-immigration stance to migrants coming from Russia and Belarus.[65]

Organization

Leadership

No. Image Name Tenure
1 Maciej Płażyński 18 October 2001–
1 June 2003
2 Donald Tusk 1 June 2003–
8 November 2014
3 Ewa Kopacz 8 November 2014–
26 January 2016
4 Grzegorz Schetyna 26 January 2016–
29 January 2020
5 Borys Budka 29 January 2020–
3 July 2021
(2) Donald Tusk since 3 July 2021

Notable politicians

Political support

See also: Poland A and B
Civic Platform's support is concentrated in the west and north of the country. Areas voting for Bronisław Komorowski in 2010 are shaded orange above.

As of 2020, the party enjoyed the greatest support in large cities and among people with higher education and in managerial positions, while in terms of age, the electorate was evenly distributed,[66] and the electoral base of the Civic Platform lay in middle-aged, highly educated gold-collar and white-collar workers of the middle and upper-middle classes.[66] As of 2020, the Civic Platform electorate was made up of more women than men, was disproportionally represented by middle-aged, urban and middle-class voters, and was characterized by higher levels of education, higher position in the socio-professional structure, as well as moderate religiosity and Roman Catholicism.[67] The party consistently enjoyed overwhelming support of workers such as directors, managers and specialists, business owners and co-owners, and administrative workers.[66] At the same time, the party underperformed amongst blue-collar workers, young voters, farmers and students, as well as unemployed voters.[66] In regards to age, Civic Platform performed the best amongst voters aged 40–49, while also performing strongly among 30-39 and 50-59 year olds. The party performs the worst amongst the oldest (aged 60 or more) and the youngest (aged 29 or less) voters.[66] The party strongly appealed to urban voters, as almost a half of voters living in big cities (500,000 people or more) vote for Civic Platform; support for the party remains strong in middle-sized cities but strongly declines in small towns and the countryside, as on average only 15% of rural voters support it.[66]

As of 2016, an overwhelming majority of party's supporters (83%) were Roman Catholics, and 44% of these voters partook in religious practices at least once a week.[68] As of 2016, the party was supported by the Christian left, as well as liberal and moderate Catholics,[68] while most of conservative Catholics in Poland support Law and Justice instead.[68] Churchgoing Catholics are roughly evenly split between Civic Platform and Law and Justice, with a significant minority of churchgoers supporting Polish People's Party as well.[68] Catholics who support Civic Platform "oppose, on the one hand, the state's enforcement of religious norms and, on the other, do not condone their violation".[69] This is largely consistent with the party's attitude towards religion, which combines a moderately conservative and politically Catholic program with left-wing economic slogans, supported by Catholic social teaching and the teaching of John Paul II contained in the encyclical Centesimus annus.[69]

As of 2020, most of Civic Platform's electorate identified as liberal conservatives, centrists and moderate conservatives.[70] No tendency dominates, as the party's supporters are roughly evenly split between political tendencies - 35% of party's supporters identify with political center, 28% as left-wing, and 24% as right-wing.[70] Throughout the 2010s, Civic Platform had been losing left-wing supporters due to the re-emergence of Lewica as well as Janusz Palikot's defection from the party.[70] The party also faced a challenge from Nowoczesna, whose vote "came largely from former Civic Platform supporters, disappointed with its failure to shake off its social conservatism".[71] According to Janusz Jartyś of the University of Szczecin, the ideological base of Civic Platform are "national-conservative, liberal and social-democratic voters", with each faction expecting "at least partial implementation of their demands, stability in the governance of the country and social peace".[72] According to Søren Riishøj, the party is also unpopular amongst the traditionally social-democratic voters, who are opposed to Europeanisation and globalization, and are critical of the Civic Platform's "almost U.S. type of election campaign."[73]

As of 2021, according to CBOS, Civic Platform was overwhelmingly popular amongst pro-European voters, with almost 80% of party's supporters wishing to cooperate with the European Union more.[74] The party is generally supported by moderates, as most of the party's voters wish for a "compromise" on issues such as abortion.[74] Economically, the party is supported by pro-business and welfare-oriented voters alike; while most of Civic Platform's supporters believe that Poland should become a welfare state, they are evenly split on issues such as progressive taxation and flat tax, and nationalization vs. privatization.[74] The party has also enjoyed the support of regionalists, autonomists and voters supportive of decentralization and localism in general.[74] Over 90% of Civic Platform supporters believe that local governments should have more power and that the national government should devolve its power to the regional governments of gminas and voivodeships.[74] The party is supported by Silesian regionalists,[75] and had organized joint electoral lists with Silesian parties like Silesian Autonomy Movement and Silesian Regional Party.[76] Local politicians of the Civic Platform in Silesia are often associated with Silesian regionalism as well.[77] The party also enjoys support from the Kashubians and their local autonomist movement,[78] with the co-founder of the party, Donald Tusk, having expressed his support for autonomous Kashubia in 1992.[79]

In March 2023, Tusk stated that Silesian should be considered a language rather than an ethnolect as it has unique literature and grammar, and promised to recognize Silesian as an official, statutory language of Upper Silesia.[80][81] Tusk also declared that he was a regionalist.[80]

Election results

Presidential

Election year Candidate 1st round 2nd round
# of overall votes % of overall vote # of overall votes % of overall vote
2005 Donald Tusk 5,429,666 36.3 (#1) 7,022,319 46.0 (#2)
2010 Bronisław Komorowski 6,981,319 41.5 (#1) 8,933,887 53.0 (#1)
2015 Supported Bronisław Komorowski 5,031,060 33.8 (#2) 8,112,311 48.5 (#2)
2020 Rafał Trzaskowski 5,917,340 30.5 (#2) 10,018,263 48.9 (#2)

Sejm

Election Leader Votes % Seats +/– Government
2001 Maciej Płażyński 1,651,099 12.7 (#2)
65 / 460
 SLD-UP-PSL (2001-2003)
SLD-UP (2003-2005)
SLD-UP-SDPL (2004-2005)
2005 Donald Tusk 2,849,259 24.1 (#2)
133 / 460
 Increase 68 PiS Minority (2005)
PiS–SRP–LPR (2006-2007)
2007 6,701,010 41.5 (#1)
209 / 460
 Increase 76 PO–PSL
2011 5,629,773 39.2 (#1)
207 / 460
 Decrease 2 PO–PSL
2015 Ewa Kopacz 3,661,474 24.1 (#2)
138 / 460
 Decrease 69 PiS
2019 Grzegorz Schetyna 5,060,355 27.4 (#2)
102 / 460
 Decrease 36 PiS
As part of Civic Coalition, which won 134 seats in total.
2023 Donald Tusk 6,629,402 30.7 (#2)
127 / 460
 Increase 25 KO-PL2050-KP-NL
As part of Civic Coalition, which won 157 seats in total.

Senate

Election Vtes % Seats +/– Majority
2001 6,582,224 24.34 (#2)
2 / 100
 SLD–UP
As part of the Senate 2001 coalition, which won 15 seats.
2005 4,090,497 16.94 (#2)
34 / 100
 Increase 32 No majority - PiS largest (2005)
PiS–SRP–LPR (2006-2007)
2007 12,734,742 39.14 (#1)
60 / 100
 Increase 26 PO
2011 5,173,300 35.60 (#1)
63 / 100
 Increase 3 PO–PSL
2015 4,323,789 28.85 (#2)
34 / 100
 Decrease 29 PiS
2019 6,490,306 35.66 (#2)
41 / 100
 Increase 7 KO–KP–SLD
As part of the Civic Coalition, which won 43 seats.
2023 6,187,295 28.91 (#2)
41 / 100
 Steady 0 KO–PL2050–KP–NL–LR
As part of the Senate Pact 2023, which won 66 seats.

European Parliament

Election Leader votes % Seats +/– EP Group
2004 Jerzy Buzek 1,467,775 24.1 (#1)
15 / 54
 New EPP-ED
2009 Danuta Hübner 3,271,852 44.4 (#1)
25 / 50
 Increase 10 EPP
2014 2,271,215 32.1 (#1)
19 / 51
 Decrease 6 EPP
2019 Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz 5,249,935 27.89 (#2)
14 / 51
 Decrease 5 EPP
As part of the European Coalition, that won 22 seats in total.
2024 Marcin Kierwiński 4,359,443 37.04 (#1)
18 / 51
 Increase 4 EPP
As part of the Civic Coalition, that won 21 seats in total.

Regional assemblies

Election year % of
vote 		# of
overall seats won 		+/–
2002 12.1 (#4)
79 / 561
In coalition with Law and Justice (POPiS).
2006 27.2 (#1)
186 / 561
2010 30.9 (#1)
222 / 561
 Increase 36
2014 26.3 (#2)
179 / 555
 Decrease 43
2018 27.1 (#2)
194 / 552
 Increase 15
As the Civic Coalition.
2024 30.6 (#2)
210 / 552
 Increase 16
As the Civic Coalition.

Voivodeship Marshals

Name Image Voivodeship Date Vocation
Elżbieta Polak Lubusz Voivodeship 29 November 2010
Marek Woźniak Greater Poland Voivodeship 10 October 2005
Piotr Całbecki Kuyavian-Pomeranian Voivodeship 24 January 2006
Olgierd Geblewicz West Pomeranian Voivodeship 7 December 2010
Mieczysław Struk Pomeranian Voivodeship 22 February 2010
Andrzej Buła Opole Voivodeship 12 November 2013

See also

Notes

  1. ^ The party is officially the Civic Platform of the Republic of Poland (Platforma Obywatelska Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej).

References

  1. ^ Drabik, Piotr (1 June 2023). "PiS nie jest największą partią w Polsce. "Liczy się tylko kartel czterech"". Radio ZET (in Polish). O połowę mniej członków od PiS obecnie posiada Platforma Obywatelska (24 497). [The Civic Platform currently has half as many members as PiS (24,497).]
  2. ^ "Ludzie - Platforma Obywatelska". platforma.org.pl. Retrieved 19 May 2024.
  3. ^ "Ludzie - Platforma Obywatelska". platforma.org.pl. Retrieved 18 July 2024.
  4. ^ Budny, Michał (2022). "The Process of Acquiring Political Relevance of Law and Justice Elections". Political Preferences. 30 (2). Institute of Local Initiatives: 50. doi:10.31261/polpre.2022.2.45-59.
  5. ^ Millard, Frances (2007). "The 2005 parliamentary and presidential elections in Poland". Electoral Studies. 26. Colchester: University of Essex: 213.
  6. ^ "BBC News (2007-10-22): Massive win for Polish opposition". 22 October 2007.
  7. ^ a b c Warsaw Business Journal Archived 20 December 2010 at the Wayback Machine
  8. ^ "Elections 2011 - Election results". National Electoral Commission. Retrieved 20 November 2011.
  9. ^ "Pkw | Pkw". Pe2014.pkw.gov.pl. Archived from the original on 24 August 2014. Retrieved 16 July 2014.
  10. ^ "Oficjalne wyniki wyborów samorządowych. Zobacz, kto wygrał". TVN24.pl. Retrieved 16 January 2019.
  11. ^ Jęczmionka, Paulina (11 May 2015). "Oficjalne wyniki wyborów 2015: Bronisław Komorowski wziął Poznań i Wielkopolskę [INFOGRAFIKA]". Gloswielkopolski.pl (in Polish). Retrieved 16 January 2019.
  12. ^ "Wybory parlamentarne 2015. PKW podała ostateczne wyniki". Onet Wiadomości (in Polish). 27 October 2015. Retrieved 16 January 2019.
  13. ^ "Znamy wyniki wyborów! Relacja na żywo. Wybory samorządowe 2018". www.fakt.pl. 20 October 2018. Retrieved 16 January 2019.
  14. ^ "Oficjalne wyniki wyborów do europarlamentu". TVN24.pl. Retrieved 14 August 2019.
  15. ^ Jan Cienski (1 October 2023). "Huge but glum: Poland's opposition puts a million people on the streets". Politico. Retrieved 16 October 2023.
  16. ^ a b Paweł Kamiński; Patrycja Rozbicka (2016). "Political Parties and Trade Unions in the Post-Communist Poland: Class Politics that Have Never a Chance to Happen". Polish Political Science Yearbook. 45 (1): 198. doi:10.15804/ppsy2016015. ISSN 0208-7375. Interestingly, though, more of them have supported the neoliberal centre-right Civil Platform, which in power with its coalition partner PSL (Polish Peasants' Party) since 2008 until 2015.
  17. ^ a b Piotr Żuk; Anna Pacześniak (15 December 2022). "Is it possible to defeat right-wing populist authorities by winning elections? The erosion of democracy and the system of the triple-masters class in Poland". Frontiers in Political Science. 4 (1): 7. doi:10.3389/fpos.2022.1040616. KO is made up of several parties, the largest of which is Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska—PO). PO was in power twice: from 2007 until 2011 and later, between 2011 and 2015, acting as a senior partner in a coalition with the Polish People's Party (PSL) and occupied the office of the Prime Minister for two full terms. This center-right party formed in 2001 combines economic neoliberalism with social conservatism.
  18. ^ Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe". Party Politics. 14 (4): 436. doi:10.1177/1354068808090253. ISSN 1426-8876. S2CID 16727049. This argument also seems broadly confirmed taking into account more recent developments in Poland where both large newer centre-right parties, Civic Platform and Law and Justice, have developed more complex ideological narratives centring on the nature of post-communist transformation.
  19. ^ Anna Pacześniak; Michał Jacuński; Jean-Michel De Waele (2012). "Ideological Identification of Medium–Level Party Cadres in Poland". Polish Political Science Yearbook. 41 (1): 383. doi:10.15804/ppsy2012019. ISSN 0208-7375. Since 2005 the main political competitors have been two parties with Solidarity roots enjoying the highest electoral support: the right–wing Law and Justice (PiS) and the centre–right Civic Platform (PO).
  20. ^ PO has often been described as centre-right:
  21. ^ Szczerbiak, Aleks (30 November 2016). "An anti-establishment backlash that shook up the party system? The October 2015 Polish parliamentary election" (PDF). European Politics and Society. 18 (4): 404–427. doi:10.1080/23745118.2016.1256027. S2CID 157951515. As discussed below, under Mr Tusk's leadership, Civic Platform turned from being a centre-right liberal-conservative party into an ideologically eclectic centrist grouping...
  22. ^ Some sources have described PO as having shifted from the centre-right to the centre.[21]
  23. ^ [16][17][18][19][20][22]
  24. ^ PO has often been described as centrist:
  25. ^ PO has often been described as centre-left:
  26. ^ Sean Hanley; Aleks Szczerbiak; Tim Haughton; Brigid Fowler (2008). "Sticking Together: Explaining Comparative Centre—Right Party Success in Post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe". Party Politics. 14 (4): 417. doi:10.1177/1354068808090253. ISSN 1426-8876. S2CID 16727049. Instead, three new centre-right and right-wing parliamentary parties emerged: the liberal-conservative Civic Platform (PO), the national-social conservative Law and Justice (PiS) party, and the clerical-nationalist League of Polish Families (LPR).
  27. ^ Tim Bale; Aleks Szczerbiak (2008). "Why Is There No Christian Democracy in Poland — and Why Should We Care?". Party Politics. 14 (4): 491. doi:10.1177/1354068808090256. ISSN 1460-3683. S2CID 143595310. At root, Civic Platform is a right-wing liberal or liberal-conservative, rather than an archetypal Christian Democratic, party.
  28. ^
  29. ^ Magdalena M. Molendowska (2017). "Christian Democracy in Poland (19th–21st Century)". Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio K – Politologia. 24 (1): 180–196. doi:10.17951/k.2017.24.1.179. S2CID 158351234.
  30. ^ Kowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii". Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish). 15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 250. ISSN 2353-9747. When it was established in 2001, the Civic Platform (PO) referred to liberal and conservative values. In its ideological declaration, Christian values were recognised as one of the canons.
  31. ^ José Magone (2010). Contemporary European Politics: A Comparative Introduction. Routledge. p. 457. ISBN 978-0-203-84639-1. Retrieved 19 July 2013.
  32. ^ "Poland's PiS smashes opposition in European election vote". POLITICO. 26 May 2019. Retrieved 27 December 2021.
  33. ^ Marjorie Castle (2015). "Poland". In M. Donald Hancock; Christopher J. Carman; Marjorie Castle; David P. Conradt; Raffaella Y. Nanetti; Robert Leonardi; William Safran; Stephen White (eds.). Politics in Europe. CQ Press. p. 636. ISBN 978-1-4833-2305-3.
  34. ^ a b c "Wahlkampf-Attacken im konservativen Lager". Der Standard (in German). 29 June 2005. Retrieved 1 April 2023.
  35. ^ "Tusk Vs Kaczyński: Explaining the Conflict". Political Critique. 4 May 2017. Retrieved 21 February 2023. It was actually a conservative liberal party, with a moderate conservative agenda, and moderately anti-communist.
  36. ^
  37. ^ Alan G. Smith (2016). A Comparative Introduction to Political Science: Contention and Cooperation. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 207. ISBN 9781442252608.
  38. ^
  39. ^ "Explainer: Whatever happened to Polish liberal conservatives?". Polandin.
  40. ^ Szczepański, Jarosław (2015). Raport z badania : trójkąt ideologiczny. Uniwersytet Warszawski. Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych. Warszawa: Wydział Dziennikarstwa i Nauk Politycznych UW. ISBN 978-83-63183-98-1. OCLC 939904795.
  41. ^ "Is Poland's Civic Platform a serious threat to the ruling party?". EUROPP. 4 May 2017. Retrieved 27 December 2021.
  42. ^ Riishøj, Søren (2011). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011" (PDF). University of Southern Denmark. ISSN 1399-7319. Archived (PDF) from the original on 27 December 2021.
  43. ^ Szczerbiak, Aleks (18 January 2016). "What Are The Prospects For Poland's Opposition?". Social Europe. Retrieved 27 December 2021.
  44. ^ Ingo Peters (2011). 20 Years Since the Fall of the Berlin Wall: Transitions, State Break-Up and Democratic Politics in Central Europe and Germany. BWV Verlag. p. 280. ISBN 978-3-8305-1975-1. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
  45. ^ "Platforma Obywatelska przedstawia nowe stanowisko w sprawie aborcji". Onet Wiadomości (in Polish). 18 February 2021. Retrieved 9 March 2021.
  46. ^ "Premier na Kongresie Kobiet: przeciw radykalnym rozwiązaniom". PolskieRadio24.pl. Retrieved 9 March 2021.
  47. ^ Stuart Shield (2012). "Opposing Neoliberalism? Poland's Renewed Populism and Post-Communist Transition". Third World Quarterly. 33 (2): 367. doi:10.15804/ppsy2016015. JSTOR 41507174. Despite this, the two centre-right parties, the neoliberal Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska - PO) and Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc - PIS), failed to offer any serious credible alternative.
  48. ^ PO has often been described as neoliberal:
  49. ^ "Zur Lage der Bürgerplattform (PO) in Polen". Konrad Adenauer Foundation (in German). 25 April 2008. Retrieved 1 April 2023.
  50. ^ "Polish nurses set to strike over low pay". Politico. 10 September 2015. Retrieved 1 April 2023.
  51. ^ "ząd podwyższa akcyzę i zamraża płace". forsal.pl. 2 October 2013. Retrieved 31 August 2014.
  52. ^ "Rząd zaciska pasa: zamraża pensje, podnosi akcyzę na papierosy i paliwa". wyborcza.biz. 23 October 2011. Retrieved 31 August 2014.
  53. ^ "Rzeczpospolita". rp.pl. 8 March 2010. Archived from the original on 27 September 2014. Retrieved 31 August 2014.
  54. ^ "Dziś dowiemy się, dlaczego rząd zabierze nam ulgi". bankier.pl. 26 July 2012. Retrieved 31 August 2014.
  55. ^ Sebastian Bobrowski (25 March 2014). "Zmiany w odliczaniu VAT od samochodów. Sprawdź ile i kiedy możesz odliczyć". mamstartup.pl. Archived from the original on 19 April 2014. Retrieved 31 August 2014.
  56. ^ "Głosowanie nad przyjęciem w całości projektu ustawy o zmianie niektórych ustaw związanych z realizacją ustawy budżetowej, w brzmieniu proponowanym przez Komisję Finansów Publicznych, wraz z przyjętymi poprawkami". sejm.gov.pl. 16 December 2011. Retrieved 31 August 2014.
  57. ^ "Poland coal phase out pledged for 2040 by opposition government". Retrieved 12 October 2019.
  58. ^ Søren Riishøj [in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011". Political Science Publications. 24 (1): 30. In other words, on the policy and programme level the Civic Platform (PO) developed into a centre-right soft Thatcherite liberal, anti-communist, soft Christian nationalist and populist party.
  59. ^ "Polish politicians attack migrants for electoral gain". 9 July 2023. Retrieved 15 July 2023. "Donald Tusk is toying with anti-migrant language to match the tone of the ruling Law and Justice party.
  60. ^ "There Are Right and Wrong Ways to Fight For Democracy". The Washington Post. Retrieved 15 July 2023.
  61. ^ Szymon Wróbel (2011). "Mourning Populism. The Case of Poland". Polish Sociological Review. 176 (1): 445, 448. JSTOR 41478893. On the other hand however, the victory of Civic Platform (CP) [Platforma Obywatelska] in the parliamentary elections in September 2007 had much to do with the promise of a new Ireland, our dream to come true. The fact that it was such a successful message and that it became a true banner of the victory allows us to see CP's success in terms of populism. (...) If we come back to Laclau's distinction one could even say that CP's populism and L&J's populism seek to attain what Laclau recognizes as unconceivable.
  62. ^ "Trzaskowski: 500 plus musi być bronione". gazetaprawna.pl. 2 July 2020.
  63. ^ "Program Partii Platforma Obywatelska". 4 April 2017.
  64. ^ "Partie i kandydaci".
  65. ^
    |""A powerful shot from a cannon." Tusk announces suspension of right to asylum". oko.press. 12 October 2024. "There is no surprise, but Prime Minister Tusk went further than expected: he announced the suspension of the right to asylum. He said: "One of the elements of the migration strategy will be a temporary, territorial suspension of the right to asylum, and I will demand recognition in Europe for this decision.
  66. ^ a b c d e f Biskup, Bartłomiej (2020). "Portret wyborców AD 2019. Zmiany w preferencjach elektoratów partyjnych w Polsce" (PDF). Studia Politologiczne (in Polish). 55 (1). Warsaw University: 306–307. doi:10.33896/SPolit.2020.55.13. S2CID 238178401.
  67. ^ Zagała, Zbigniew (2020). "Partie polityczne i ich elektoraty. Od sympatii do antagonizmu. Na przykładzie Platformy Obywatelskiej i Prawa i Sprawiedliwości". Przegląd Politologiczny (in Polish). 2 (2). Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa UAM: 198. doi:10.14746/pp.2020.25.2.14. ISSN 1426-8876. S2CID 225679632.
  68. ^ a b c d Secler, Bartłomiej (2016). Religia i Religijność a Poziom Frekwencji Wyborczej (PDF) (in Polish). Wydawnictwo Morpho. p. 109. ISBN 978-83-62352-35-7.
  69. ^ a b Kowalczyk, Krzysztof (2015). "Stanowiska polskich partii politycznych wobec religii i Kościoła. Propozycja typologii". Studia Politicae Universitatis Silesiensis (in Polish). 15 (1). University of Silesia in Katowice: 168. ISSN 2353-9747.
  70. ^ a b c Zagała, Zbigniew (2020). "Partie polityczne i ich elektoraty. Od sympatii do antagonizmu. Na przykładzie Platformy Obywatelskiej i Prawa i Sprawiedliwości". Przegląd Politologiczny (in Polish). 2 (2). Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wydziału Nauk Politycznych i Dziennikarstwa UAM: 193–205. doi:10.14746/pp.2020.25.2.14. ISSN 1426-8876. S2CID 225679632.
  71. ^ Koczanowicz, Leszek (December 2016). "The Polish Case: Community and Democracy under the PiS". New Left Review. 102 (1): 78.
  72. ^ Jartyś, Janusz (2016). "Kwestie obyczajowe w programie i działalności Platformy Obywatelskiej Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej". Acta Politica Polonica (in Polish). 35 (1). Uniwersytet Szczeciński: 59–66. doi:10.18276/ap.2016.35-05.
  73. ^ Søren Riishøj [in Danish] (2010). "The Civic Platform in Poland - the first decade 2001-2011". Political Science Publications. 24 (1): 15.
  74. ^ a b c d e Roguska, Beata (August 2021). "Elektoraty o istotnych kwestiach społeczno-politycznych". Komunikat z Badań (in Polish). 91 (1). Centre for Public Opinion Research: 9–10. ISSN 2353-5822.
  75. ^ Jedlecki, Przemysław (8 August 2019). "Śląscy autonomiści dołączają do Koalicji Obywatelskiej" (in Polish). Wyborcza.
  76. ^ Pawlik, Paweł (9 August 2019). "Ruch Autonomii Śląska na listach Koalicji Obywatelskiej" (in Polish). Onet.
  77. ^ "Śląskie Porozumienie Wyborcze nawiązuje współpracę z Koalicją Obywatelską. Śląski wyborca musi mieć pewność, że głos na regionalistów nie będzie głosem zmarnowanym". autonomia.pl (in Polish). 8 August 2019.
  78. ^ Noch, Jakub (6 October 2015). ""Zemsta za Tuska i brak poparcia PiS". Jak i dlaczego Kaszubi jednoczą się przeciw PiS, który chce ich "rozbioru"" (in Polish). NaTemat.
  79. ^ Tusk, Donald (June 1992). "Regionalizm jako samodzielna siła polityczna" (PDF). Pomerania (in Polish). Gdańsk.
  80. ^ a b "Tusk: Śląski będzie językiem regionalnym, też na poziomie ustawowym" (in Polish). Bankier. 19 March 2023.
  81. ^ Konopka, Krzysztof; Mikowski, Mateusz (19 March 2023). "Tusk: język śląski będzie uznany za język regionalny". Polish Press Agency.

Sources

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